Abstract. The paper presents an algorithm to verify consistency of InterOrganizational Workflows (IOWF) with Multi-level Security (MLS) features. The algorithm verifies whether the implementation of Inter-Organizational Workflow with Multi-level Security features meets the specification. The algorithm reduces the workflows of participating organizations using the reduction rules while preserving the communication patterns between organizations. The paper presents an algorithm to identify redundant implicit places in the IOWF with MLS features. We conclude that IOWF with MLS features is k-consistent with Message Sequence Chart (MSC) if the number and order of messages passed between organizations in reduced IOWF with MLS features is same as that in original MSC.
Introduction
The motivation for this paper stems from the need of companies involved in ecommerce to have secure and correct inter-organizational workflows. The Internet, which is the primary medium for conducting e-commerce, is by design an open nonsecure medium. Inter-Organizational Workflows allow data sharing and work coordination at the global level as the globalisation of business becomes a common practice. However, the prolific use of inter-organizational workflows for critical and strategic applications makes security an essential and integral part. Another major problem with inter-organizational workflow is that they often use heterogeneous and distributed hardware and software systems to execute a given workflow. This gives rise to decentralized security policies and mechanisms that need to be managed.
Inter-organizational workflows merged with multilevel security features provide the necessary security. However sophisticated techniques are required to review, analyse, and test this approach for correct behavior because presence of errors can result in serious consequences [5] .
Inter-Organizational Workflow (IOWF) becomes important as it provides solution for data sharing, heterogeneity in resources and work coordination at global level. However, a secured computing infrastructure like Multilevel Security (MLS) is needed to support today's vast businesses. In this paper Message Sequence Charts (MSC) are used to specify the positive and negative interactions between organizations. Petri nets are used to model workflows in each organization. IOWF is obtained by using message sequence charts and workflows of each organization.
Inter-organizational Workflows
E-commerce is the process of managing online financial transactions by individuals and companies. This includes consumer and business-to-business transactions. The focus of e-commerce is on the systems and procedures whereby financial documents and information of all types is exchanged.
IOWF Architectures
This section presents conceptual architectures for supporting inter-organizational workflows [10] . Capacity sharing architecture assumes centralized control. Even though the execution of tasks is distributed over the resources of several business partners, the routing of workflow is under the control of one workflow manager. Chained execution architecture involves splitting of the workflow process into a number of disjoint sub-processes that are executed by different participating business partners in a sequential order. Subcontracting architecture involves one business partner, which subcontracts sub-processes to other business partners. For the top-level business partner the subcontracted sub-processes appear to be atomic. Case transfer architecture (CTA) comprises of each business partner having a copy of the workflow process description, i.e., the process specification is replicated. It is assumed that each of the business partners uses the same process definition. Extended case transfer architecture (ECTA) allows local variations in process definition, i.e., at a specific location the process may be extended with additional tasks. It is important that the extensions allow for the proper transfer of cases. Loosely coupled architecture (LCA) consists of the process being cut into pieces, which may be active in parallel. Also the definition of each of the sub-processes is local, i.e. the environment does not know the process. Only the protocol used to communicate is public for the other business partners. This allows individual organization, in a distributed system, to change without affecting or requiring change in any other part of the system. For IOWF we need an architecture that is decentralized, flexible with respect to local workflow specification, supports hierarchical and non-hierarchical control distribution, allows parallel execution of workflow and supports distributed collaboration. Loosely coupled architecture supports all this requirements.
Multilevel Security
It is a concept involving mandatory access control (MAC), i.e. the system enforces security policy regardless of the actions of system users or administrators. Multi-level Security (MLS) systems [7] strive to enforce the security restrictions with incredibly high reliability so as to not leak any data at all. Any two-security levels can be compared based upon their clearance levels and classification levels. Given two security levels, first their clearance levels are compared. If the clearance levels are different then hierarchical ordering of clearance levels is used to determine which security level has higher precedence over the other. This is followed by comparison of their classification levels to determine the reading and writing rights. For example in Figure 1 , if we have to compare two security labels T{A, B} and S{A} then we first conclude that T{A,B} has higher precedence than S{A} based on hierarchical ordering of classification levels. Then we compare classification levels of two given security labels. We conclude that T{A,B} can read data labeled S{A} since it contains the A compartment. If we have to compare security labels T{} and S{A} then we first conclude that T{} has higher precedence than S{A} based on hierarchical ordering of classification levels. Then we compare classification levels of two given security labels. We conclude that T{} cannot read data labeled S{A} since it does not contain the A compartment.
If clearance levels are same then the classification levels determine the higher precedence as well as the reading and writing rights. For example in Figure 1 , if we have to compare two security labels T{A,B} and T{A} then based upon classification levels we conclude that T{A,B} has higher precedence than T{A} and T{A,B} can read data labeled T{A}.
Algorithm: Merging MLS into IOWF Input: IOWF Output: IOWF with MLS features 1. Identify a set of subjects A={A 1 , A 2 ,...,A p }, where p ≥1 for any of the workflows. 2. Determine a set of hierarchical clearance levels {X 1 , X 2 ,...,X m } for subjects, where 1 ≤ m ≤ p and X j has higher precedence than X i for j > i. 3 . Identify a set of objects B={B 1 , B 2 , ... ,B q } where q ≥ 0 in the same workflow. 4. Determine a set of classification levels {Y 1 , Y 2 ,... Y n } for objects depending upon its sensitivity, where 0 ≤ n ≤ q. 5. Combine clearance levels and classification levels to obtain security lattice with security labels S k = X i {Y 1 , Y 2 , ... Y j } where i ≤ m, j ≤ n, k ≤ m2 n , as nodes. 6. Assign security labels to subjects and objects taking into account Bell-LaPadula security model and the working of the participating workflow, to form a security lattice of applicable security labels. If A is a set of all subjects and S is the set of all security labels, then there exists a many-to-one onto function f 1 : A → S. If B is a set of all objects and S is the set of all security labels, then there exists a many-to-one onto function f 2 : B → S. 7. Repeat steps 1 to 6 for all organizations. 8. Combine security lattices of participating organizations taking into account which security label can read which other security label, to obtain security lattice for the whole IOWF. If S 1 and S 2 are two security labels such that S 1 can read S 2 then introduce an arrow from S 1 to S 2 in the security lattice indicating reading rights. 9. Compare security label of subject with security label of object it is trying to access. Grant access only if the subject is cleared to access that object, otherwise deny access.
Bell-LaPadula Security Model
The Bell-LaPadula Model [2] , also called the multi-level model, was originally proposed by in 1970s. It is a formal state transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules. In this formal model, the entities in a computer system are divided into abstract sets of subjects and objects. A "subject" is somebody (user) who wants access to an "object" (information, data file, system). The concept of a secure state is defined, and it is proven that each state transition preserves security by moving from secure state to secure state, thereby inductively proving that the system is secure. The concept of a secure state is defined by two properties: the simple security (ss) property and the *-property.
(1) ss-property allows all low-level information to be available at a higher level. It restricts high-level information to be available at a lower level. A subject is allowed to read an object only if former security label is identical or higher than latter's security label (no read up).
(2) *-property ensures there is no write down. A subject with a higher security label should not write an object of lower security label. There is a risk of Trojan horse attack if this is allowed. This security policy prevents the ability of higher security label subject to put higher security label information to lower security label information that is equivalent of declassifying information.
Within an organization there are various subjects with hierarchical security levels ranging from high to low level. Also most organizations have various classification levels for information, depending upon its sensitivity. Bell-LaPadula security model requires identification of subjects and objects in the system and assigning security labels to them. This can be easily done because of the way organizations are composed. Thus we use Bell-LaPadula model to incorporate multilevel security in IOWF.
Consistency of IOWF with MLS
In IOWFs each business partner has a private workflow process that is connected to the workflow processes of some of the other partners. It involves communication between the workflows of all participating organizations. Error in design of IOWF are thus difficult to detect and can result in some serious consequences. Therefore, there is need to detect the correctness of the IOWF. There are two concepts to verify the correctness of IOWF, namely soundness and consistency. A workflow is sound if and only if, for any case, the process terminates properly, i.e., termination is guaranteed, there are no dangling tasks and there is no deadlock in the workflow [9] . Consistency [8] deals with verifying whether the implementation of IOWF meets the specification. In this paper we address consistency issues of loosely coupled IOWFs.
Consistency
In order to specify the interaction between the various participating organizations within an IOWF, Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) are used. MSCs provide partial order of messages in an IOWF. Therefore IOWF should be designed in such a way that it should be consistent [8] with the MSC. MSC can be defined as follows [9] :
A
message sequence chart is a tuple MSC=(I, M A , M S , from, to, { i ≤ } I t∈ ) -I is a finite set of instances (business partners), -M A is a finite set of asynchronous messages, -M S is a finite set of synchronous messages, -M A ∩ M S = Ø and M = M A U M S is the set of messages, -to and from are functions from M to I, -for each i in I: ≤ i is a partial order on {?m |m in M A Λ to(m) = i} U {!m | m in M
Relation between IOWF, MSCs and Local Workflows can be informally expressed by the following equation IOWF = MSCs + Local Workflows According to this equation, if we have local workflows and the specification of communication patterns between them, we can derive the IOWF. By checking the consistency of an IOWF we can determine whether the implementation meets the specification i.e. the MSCs [10] .
It is usually difficult to describe all the communication patterns in an IOWF using MSCs. In most cases only communication patterns are given in terms of limited set of MSC. In general MSCs and implemented IOWF do deviate from each other. The participating organizations have to observe these deviations to look whether they are acceptable or not. Non-acceptable differences can result in modification of IOWF.
As there can be number of admissible patterns, it can be more efficient to specify negative MSC. Negative MSC corresponds to the communication pattern that should not occur. In case when negative MSC and MSC coincide then it results in an inconsistency as there is a pattern that is both acceptable and non acceptable. Such inconsistency should be removed.
As there can be a number of MSCs describing the behaviour of IOWF verification of consistency becomes a tough task. This leads to concept of k-consistency where k is the number of different communicational patterns described by the given MSCs. In 1-consistency it is assumed that all the participating organizations in IOWF adhere to one predefined communication pattern. Concept of 1-consistency is defined as follows [10] :
Let IOWF = (PN 1 , PN 2 (ii) It is not be possible to execute any of the scenarios specified in the negative MSCs.
1-consistency can be verified by generating all possible firing sequences and checking whether partial order ≤ MSC is not violated by any of these sequences. Partial order ≤ MSC is be defined as follows:
MSC is a transitive closure of partial order between the production and consumption of asynchronous messages (≤ oi ) and the partial order within the workflow instances ≤ inst . A MSC is said to be inconsistent if ≤ MSC does not define a partial order.
Implicit Places
In order to check the consistency of IOWF, instead of checking all possible firing sequence the concept of implicit places is used to avoid the problem of state explosion. A place in a net system is a constraint on the firing of its output transitions.
If the removal of a place does not change the behaviour of the original net system, that place represents a redundancy [3] in the system and can be removed. A place whose removal preserves the behaviour of the system is called an implicit place, also called a redundant place [6] . An implicit or redundant place always contains sufficient tokens to allow for the firing of transitions connected to it. Behaviour of a net system implies sequences of fireable transitions and marking of places in the net system. The behaviour of the net system can be represented by the reachability graph. Implicit places allow for the efficient verification of consistency. The generalized concept of implicit place set can be described as follows:
Let (PN, M) be a marked Petri net with PN=(P, T, F) and P 1 ⊆ P. P 1 is an implicit place set if and only if for every reachable state M' and any transition t in T: if each place in (•t\P I ) contains a token in state M', then each place in (•t∩P I ) contains a token in M'. Place p in P is an implicit place if and only if {p} is an implicit place set.
Implicit place does not influence the behaviour of the workflow. This means that reachability graphs of workflows with implicit places and without implicit places are the same. Removal of implicit places is significant especially in larger workflows.
If p is not the only input place of its output transition, then p may be implicit. If a transition has only one input place then that input place cannot be implicit, because in order for the transition to fire, the input place must be present and eventually be marked. In other words, we need to analyse only those input places for which the connected transitions have more than one input place.
Hence we first need to identify transitions with more than one input place and form a set T P of such transitions. Next we form a set of input places to any transition in T P and denote it as P P . Now we are ready to define the concept of implicit place.
Let (PN, M) be a marked Petri net with PN=(P, T, F) with P P ⊆ P and T P ⊆ T such that T P is a set of transitions with more the one input place and P P is set of places corresponding to •T P . If there is a path from •p i excluding p i to any one of the other places corresponding to identical rows in Pre [P P , T P ] then p i is implicit. Below we present an algorithm to identify implicit places in a workflow. transition 'Timeout' fires then a token is removed from 'Tires order' place and a token is placed in 'Tire order ready' place. This enables transition 'Send tire order' again. In this scenario, tire order is sent first, followed by occurrence of a timeout, which is followed by resending of the tire order. This scenario is depicted in message sequence chart shown in Figure 2 . If 'Receive tires order' transition is fired then any of the remaining three positive scenarios can occur. Three transitions 'Send unavailable', 'Suggest modification' and 'Send tire order acknowledgement' are enabled. Depending upon which transition fires, any one of the remaining three positive scenarios can occur. Lets say, transition 'Send tire order acknowledgement' fires then scenario corresponding to message sequence chart shown in Figure 2 occurs. From Figure 3 we also note that there is no message passing between organizations that facilitate order cancelling or sending of order updates. Once the Tire Company receives tires order and begins processing the order, it is not possible to ship the built tires without sending tire order acknowledgement. This rules out the scenario with no acknowledgment. Lastly, it is not possible for Tire Company to send acknowledgement or ship built tires without receiving the tires order. Thus it is possible to execute all positive scenarios and prevent all negative scenarios from occurring in the model shown in Figure 3 . We can say that IOWF is k-consistent with the provided message sequence charts. 
